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This paper examines an economic union where oligopolistic firms produce by skilled and 
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members to the union, regulates the labor market through a minimum wage for unskilled 
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policy. It is shown that in the political equilibrium small unions regulate the labor market but 
do not support firms, while large unions deregulate the labor market and support firms. 
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In the years 1975-2000, the US and UK experienced sharp increases in wage
inequality and rapid labor market deregulation. Aghion et al. (2001) explain
these phenomena by skill-biased technological change. In this paper, I o®er
an alternative explanation through political economy as follows: With a
little product market competition, there is a political pressure to redistribute
income through labor market regulation. Economic integration, however,
intensi¯es product market competition and leads to stagnation where slow
economic growth is associated with unemployment. This creates political
pressure to support ¯rms and de-regulate the labor market.
This paper models economic integration as a political process. I consider
an economic union, where ¯rms are subject to oligopolistic competition, but
attempt to improve their productivity through in-house R&D. I character-
ize the policy makers in the economic union by a hypothetical planner can
support ¯rms through the government budget and regulate the labor market
through imposing an e®ective minimum wage for (unskilled) labor { either
directly, or through supporting labor unions by legislation. Lobbies repre-
senting workers and ¯rms attempt to in°uence the planner for prospective
policy. Economic integration occurs, when the planner has an incentive to
accept new regions (and consequently, new ¯rms) as members to the union.
In this set up, R&D-based growth plays a crucial rule, for the labor market
would be always fully deregulated in an equilibrium with no growth.
The growth e®ects of regulation depend decisively on the structure of
economy. Where the same technology is used both in production and in
R&D, the economy behaves as if the same ¯nal good were used both in
consumption and in R&D. In that speci¯c case, labor market regulation (e.g.
the minimum wage) decreases pro¯ts, incentives to invest in R&D and the
growth rate (cf. Peretto 1998). In this study, I assume that there is di®erent
technology for production and R&D.1 With this speci¯cation, there can be
a positive dependence between the minimum wage and technological change
through cost-escaping R&D as follows. With higher wages, ¯rms have more
incentives to improve the productivity of labor through R&D (cf. Palokangas
1996, 2000, 2004). This increases investment in R&D and the growth rate.
1I take this to the extreme so that R&D employs only labor, for simplicity.
1There is also some empirical evidence on a positive relationship between
R&D and labor market regulation through high wages and unemployment.
Caballero (1993) and Hoon and Phelps (1997) show that changes in unem-
ployment and productivity growth are positively associated.
Except cost-escaping, there has been also other attempts to explain a
positive wage-growth relationship. Cahuc and Michel (1996) (using an OLG
model), as well as Agell and Lommerud (1997) (using an extensive game
framework) show that minimum wages create an incentive for workers to ac-
cumulate human capital. Meckl's (2004) assumes e±ciency wages for both
production and R&D and argues the following. The greater the size of the
high-wage sector (e.g. the R&D sector), the higher is unemployment gener-
ated by e±ciency wages. On the other hand, the greater the relative size of
the R&D sector, the higher is the growth rate of the economy. Despite of
these alternative explanations, I stick to cost-escaping, because it provides a
direct link from rents to incentives to improve technology.
I organize the remainder of this study as follows. In section 2, I present
the institutional setting of the study as an extended game. As a part of this
game, I construct speci¯c models for households in section 3, ¯rms in 4 and
for the economic union in 5. Finally, I analyze the political equilibrium in
section 6 and economic integration in section 7.
2 The setting
I consider an economic union that contains a number J of similar regions.2
A member country of the union is comprised of a smaller number (< J) of
these regions. Each region j 2 f1;:::;Jg possesses ¯xed amounts L and N of
skilled and unskilled labor, respectively.3 To examine the political economy
of growth and economic integration, the model is then composed as follows:
The ¯rms produce consumption goods from skilled and unskilled labor.
Oligopolistic competition among these determines prices in the union. Firms
invest in R&D to escape production costs. Only skilled labor is used in R&D.
2The assumption on similar regions is admittedly strong, but with asymmetric regions
there can be multiple equilibria in the model.
3With more complication, one obtains the same results on the assumption that unskilled
workers are transformed into skilled at some cost. Cf. Section 4 in Palokangas (2005).
2The planner of the union accepts new members to the union, supports
¯rms through taxation and regulates the labor market through imposing a
minimum wage for unskilled labor. The planner is self-interested and it is
lobbied by interest groups that represent workers and ¯rms.
Income distribution can be changed in favor of pro¯ts by taxing labor
input and distributing the tax revenue to ¯rms in the form of lump-sum sub-
sidies. I assume that the reversed policy intervention { subsidizing labor and
¯nancing this by setting lump-sum taxes on ¯rms { is incentive incompatible.
A ¯rm receives happily a lump-sum transfer, but responds to a lump-sum
tax easily by changing its juridical identity (e.g. by using subcontractors).
This also explains why it is easier to change income distribution in favor of
wages by minimum wages rather than subsidies.
Because a new member has access to the same technology and must adopt
the same institutions as the old members, economic integration can be char-
acterized by an increase in the size J of the economic union. Such integration
intensi¯es competition in the product market.
I use the common agency model (e.g. Bernheim and Whinston 1986,
Grossman and Helpman 1994a, and Dixit, Grossman and Helpman 1997) to
establish a political equilibrium with the following sequence of decisions:
1. Worker and employer lobbies make their o®ers to the planner (section
6). These o®ers relate the lobbies' prospective political contributions
to the planner's policy.
2. The planner support ¯rms, sets the minimum wage for unskilled labor
and accepts new members to the economic union (Section 5).
3. Firms decide how much to invest in R&D (Subsection 4.2).
4. Each ¯rm decides on its output given its expectations on the behavior
of the other ¯rms (Subsection 4.1).
5. The households decide on their consumption (Section 3).
This extended game is solved by backward induction.
33 Output, consumption and labor supply
3.1 Production technology
In each region j 2 f1;:::;Jg of the economic union, a single ¯rm (hereafter
¯rm j) produces good j from labor with technology
yj = Bjnj; (1)
where yj output, nj labor input in production and Bj is the productivity
parameter. I assume that all products j 2 f1;:::;Jg are perfect substitutes,
for simplicity.4 The total supply of the composite good in the economic












Technology (1), (2) and (3) has the useful property that with symmetry







Because consumption per region, C=J, is then independent of the size J of
the union, there are no scale e®ects on consumption. In this case, economic
integration is motivated only by rents in the goods or labor market.5
3.2 Households
All households in the economic union share the same preferences and take
income, the prices and the interest rate r as given. Thus, they all behave
4With some complication, it is possible to use a CES function here for the same purpose.
5It would be easy to extend the model so that, in line with Ethier (1982), the number
of ¯rms, J, increases the productivity of each ¯rm. In that case, the production function
(1) would change into yj = $(J)Bjnj, where $(J) is an increasing function of J. This
would create an additional incentive for the planner of the union to increase the size of
the union inde¯nitely, but without any change in the results.
4as if there were a single representative household for the whole economic
union. The household chooses its °ow of consumption C to maximize its





where µ is time, C consumption and ½ > 0 the constant rate of time prefer-
ence. Noting (2), this utility maximization leads to the Euler equation6




where p the consumption price, E total consumption expenditure, r the inter-
est rate and _ E = dE=dt. Because in the model there is no money that would
pin down the nominal price level at any time, it is convenient to normalize
the households' total consumption expenditure in the economic union, E, at
the constant number J of regions.7 This and (5) yield






yj; r = ½ = constant > 0: (6)
3.3 The labor market
Skilled labor is used both in production and R&D, but unskilled labor only
in production. I assume that technology in production is characterized by
the CES unit cost function
c(wj;vj); cw > 0; cv > 0; cww < 0; cvv < 0; cwv > 0: (7)
where vj and wj are the wages for skilled and unskilled labor, respectively,
and the subscripts w and v denote the partial derivatives with respect to
wj and vj, respectively. Following empirical evidence, I assume that the




6Cf. Grossman and Helpman (1994b).
7With this normalization, the equilibrium price p and the equilibrium wage w are
independent of the size of the economic union, J.
5The market for skilled labor is competitive, but I characterize labor mar-
ket regulation by the assumption that the planner sets the minimum wage
wj for unskilled labor. By duality, the equilibrium condition for the market
of skilled labor and the full-employment constraint for unskilled labor can be
constructed as follows:
L = cv(wj;vj)nj + lj = cv(wj=vj;1)nj + lj; (9)
N ¸ cw(wj;vj)nj = cw(wj=vj;1)nj; (10)
where nj composite labor input in production, and lj labor input in R&D.
4 Firms
4.1 Production
I assume that the planner of the economic union sets a tax ¿ ¸ 0 on produc-
tion costs c(wj;vj)nj and spends this money in paying a lump-sum subsidy





Each ¯rm j maximizes its pro¯t
¼j
: = pyj ¡ (1 + ¿)c(wj;vj)nj + °; (12)
where yj is output, by its labor input nj holding the wages (wj;vj), produc-
tivity Bj and the other ¯rms' output
P
k6=j yk constant, given the production
function (1). There are two consequences of this pro¯t maximization. Noting
(6), the pro¯t maximization yields the equilibrium condition
















Because all ¯rms j = 1;:::;J are similar, in equilibrium yk = y for all k holds
true. From this, (1), (12) and (13) it follows that
(1 + ¿)c(wj;vj) = (1 ¡ 1=J)pBj; (1 + ¿)c(wj;vj)nj = (1 ¡ 1=J)pyj;
¼j = pyj ¡ (1 + ¿)c(wj;vj)nj + ° = pyj=J + °:








at its target level Á by the wage tax ¿. Given ¿ ¸ 0, (1) and (11), it is then







































c(wj;vj)nj = (1 ¡ Á)p
J X
j=1































These results show that labor inputs in production, nj, can be constant,
provided that the wages wj and the pro¯ts ¼j change in the same proportion.
Without this property, there were no steady state in the model. The ¯rms'
income share Á has a lower limit 1=J that is determined by the size J of the
economic union.
4.2 Research and development (R&D)
Technological change for ¯rm j is characterized by a Poisson process qj as
follows. During a short time interval dµ, there is an innovation dqj = 1 with
probability ¤jdµ, and no innovation dqj = 0 with probability 1¡¤jdµ, where
¤j is the arrival rate of innovations in the research process. The arrival rate
¤j is in ¯xed proportion ¸ to labor devoted to R&D, lj,
¤j = ¸lj; ¸ > 0: (15)
I denote the serial number of technology in region j by tj and variables
depending on technology tj by superscript tj. The invention of a new tech-
nology raises tj by one and the level of productivity B
tj







During a short time interval dµ, there is a change in technology from tj to
tj +1 with probability ¤jdµ, and no change with probability 1¡¤jdµ, where
7¤j is given by (15). The average growth rate of the level of productivity (16)
in the stationary state is in ¯xed proportion (¸loga) to labor in R&D, lj (cf.
Aghion and Howitt 1998, p. 59). This leads to the following conclusion:
Proposition 1 Research input lj can be used as a proxy of the growth rate
in region j and the average research input l = 1
n
Pn
j=1 lj as a proxy of the
growth rate for the whole economic union.
Firm j's dividends are given by
¦j = ¼j ¡ vjlj; (17)
where ¼j is pro¯t, vj the skilled workers' wage, lj labor devoted to R&D and
vjlj expenditures on R&D in region j. Firm j maximizes the present value of
its dividends (17) by its input to R&D, lj, subject to technological change,








where µ is time, E the expectation operator and r the interest rate.
I consider a symmetric equilibrium where the initial productivity is the
same, B0
j = B0 for all j, for tractability. In that case
nj = n; lj = l; wj = w, vj = v, ¼j = ¼ and ¦j = ¦ for j = 1;:::;J. (19)
In the Appendix, I prove the following:
¦=¼ = 1 + (1 ¡ a)¸l=r; v = (a ¡ 1)¸¼=r; (20)
w=v = ¨(Á;l); @¨=@Á < 0; @¨=@l > 0;
n = ¢(Á;l); @¢=@Á > 0; @¢=@l < 0; (21)
N ¸ £(Á;l); @£=@Á > 0; @£=@l < 0; (22)
where the inequality (22) is the new form of the full-employment constraint
for unskilled labor, (10).
85 The economic union
5.1 Equilibrium in production and R&D
From (14) and (19) it follows that
c(w;v)n = 1 ¡ Á; ¼ = Á: (23)
By (1), (6), (19), (20) and (22), I de¯ne the present value of the expected
°ow of real income per region, y, as (cf. Aghion and Howitt 1998, p. 61)




























r + (1 ¡ a)¸l
=
B(T)£(Á;l)





From (21) and (23) it follows that





Di®erentiating the logarithm of this equation totally, and noting (21), one
obtains that skilled labor devoted to R&D, l, is an increasing function of the



















5.2 The worker and employer lobbies
The workers and the ¯rms lobby the planner which decides on the ¯rms'
income share Á ¸ 1=J, the minimum wage w for unskilled labor and new
members of the economic union (i.e. the size J of the union), given (22).
Noting the one-to-one correspondence (25), the minimum wage w can be
replaced by labor devoted to R&D, l, as the state variable. The constraints
for the state variables (l;Á;J) of the lobbying equilibrium are given by Á ¸
1=J and the full-employment constraint (22).
9I assume that all unskilled workers NJ plus a given proportion ® 2 [0;1]
of skilled workers LJ in the union belong to the worker lobby. The wages in
the economic union are equal to total labor costs in production, c(w;v)nJ,
plus those in R&D, vlJ. This implies that the total income of the members of
the worker lobby is equal to c(w;v)nJ +vlJ ¡(1¡®)vLJ, where (1¡®)vLJ
is the income of those skilled workers who do not belong to the worker lobby.
Dividing this by the number of regions, J, we obtain the typical members'
income in the worker lobby as c(w;v)n + vl ¡ (1 ¡ ®)vL:
All ¯rms belong to the employer lobby and they earn dividends ¦J. Di-
viding this by the number of regions, J, we obtain the typical members'
income in the employer lobby as ¦:
Following Grossman and Helpman (1994a), I assume that the planner has
its own interests and collects contributions Ru and Rf from the worker and
employer lobbies. A typical member of the worker lobby earns its income
c(w;v)n+vl¡(1¡®)vL minus political contributions Ru. A typical member
of the employer lobby earn its income ¦ minus political contributions Rf.
Because the e®ects through the the price level p can be internalized at the
level of the economic union, the worker lobby maximizes the present value U
of the expected °ow of a typical worker's real income
[c(w;v)n + vl ¡ (1 ¡ ®)vL ¡ Ru]=p;
and the employer lobby maximizes the present value F of the expected °ow
of a typical ¯rm's real income (¦ ¡ Rf)=p at time T. Noting (20), (23) and
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= ª[c(w;v)n + vl ¡ (1 ¡ ®)vL ¡ Ru]
= ª
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¡r(µ¡T)dµ = ª[¦ ¡ Rf]
= ª
©




U(l;Á;Rf) + F(l;Á;Rf) =
£




5.3 The self-interested planner
Noting (24), the present value the expected °ow of the real political contri-







¡r(µ¡T)dµ = ª(l;Á)(Ru + Rf): (29)












¡r(µ¡T)dµ + ³wU(l;Á;Ru) + ³fF(l;Á;Rf)
= ª(l;Á)(Ru + Rf) + ³wU(l;Á;Ru) + ³fF(l;Á;Rf)
=
£





+ (³w ¡ 1)U(l;Á;Ru) + (³f ¡ 1)F(l;Á;Rf); (30)
where constants ³w ¸ 0 and ³f ¸ 0 are weights of the worker's and the ¯rm's
welfare in the government's preferences, respectively.
Grossman and Helpman's (1994a) objective function (30) is widely used in
models of common agency and it has been justi¯ed as follows. The politicians
are mainly interested in their own income which consists of the contributions
from the public, Ru + Rf, but because they must defend their position in
general elections, they must sometimes take the utilities of the interest groups
U(l;Á;Ru) and F(l;Á;Rf) into account directly. The linearity of (30) in
ª[Ru + Rf] is assumed, for simplicity.
6 The political equilibrium
The workers' and employers' lobbies try to a®ect the planner by their con-
tributions Ru and Rf. The contribution schedules are therefore functions of
11the planner's policy variables:
Ru(l;Á); Rf(l;Á): (31)
The planner maximizes its utility function (30) by (l;Á), given the con-
tribution schedules (31) and the constraints Á ¸ 1=J and (22). Following
proposition 1 of Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997), a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium for this game is a set of contribution schedules Ru(l;Á) and
Rf(l;Á) and policy (l;Á) such that the following conditions (i) ¡ (iv) hold:
(i) Contributions Ru and Rf are non-negative but no more than the con-
tributor's income.
(ii) The policy (Á;l) maximizes the planner's welfare (30) taking the con-
tribution schedules Ru and Rf as given,
(l;Á) 2 arg max











l;Á)) that yields it a higher level of utility than in equi-
librium, given the planner's anticipated decision rule,
(l;Á) = arg max




(l;Á) = arg max




(iv) The worker lobby (employer lobby) provides the planner at least with
the level of utility than in the case it o®ers nothing Ru = 0 (Rf = 0),






















12Noting (31) and (32), the planner's utility function (30) changes into
G(l;Á) : = G(l;Á;Ru(l;Á);Rf(l;Á))
= ª(l;Á) + (³w ¡ 1) max
(l;Á) s.t. Á ¸ 1=J and (22)
U(l;Á;Ru(l;Á))
+ (³f ¡ 1) max




































The Lagrangean for the maximization of the planner's utility function (33)
by (l;Á) subject to the elasticity constraint Á ¸ 1=J and the full-employment
constraint (22) is given by
H = G(l;Á) + ´[Á ¡ 1=J] + "[N ¡ £(Á;l)]; (34)
where the multipliers " and # are subject to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
´[Á ¡ 1=J] = 0; ´ ¸ 0; "[N ¡ £(Á;l)] = 0; " ¸ 0: (35)
Noting (22), (24), (33) and (34), the ¯rst-order conditions for the maximiza-




















If the size of the union, J, is small, then Á = 1=J. In that case, by (34) and
(35), ´ > 0 and @H=@J = ´=J2 > 0 hold true. If the union is large enough,










> 0; N = £;
and @H=@J = ´=J2 ´ 0. These results can be rephrased as follows:
13Proposition 2 The planner has no incentives to prevent integration (i.e.
the increase of J), @H=@J = ´=J2 ¸ 0. In a small union, the ¯rms are not
supported (¿ = 0 and Á = 1=J). In a large union, the ¯rms are supported
(¿ > 0 and Á > 1=J) and the labor market is deregulated (£ = N).
Both current income and the growth rate increase the planner's welfare.
Because integration increases competition and improves e±ciency, it does
not harm the planner. Since competition increases the demand for labor in
production, then, in a large union, a large proportion of labor is devoted
to production and only a small proportion to R&D. Because this leaves very
little space for R&D and economic growth, the planner must start supporting
¯rms. Because this boosts economic growth, labor market regulation is no
more needed for that purpose. Consequently, in a large union, the labor
market is deregulated to increase current income.
In a small economic union with no support to ¯rms, Á = 1=J, noting
(22), (24), (33), (35) and (36), there are two possibilities:
(a) The present value of the expected °ow of real income, ª, does not attain















In that case, the labor market is deregulated (i.e. unemployment).
(b) The present value of the expected °ow of real income, ª, attains its
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In that case, the labor market is regulated (i.e. full employment).
Together with Proposition 2, these results can be rephrased as follows:
Proposition 3 In a small union, the ¯rms are not supported and the labor
market is either deregulated or regulated. When the labor market regulated,
economic integration will reverse this at some stage so that the ¯rms are
supported and the labor market deregulated.
148 Conclusions
This paper examines an economic union with a large number of regions, each
producing a di®erent good. The union expands by integrating new regions.
Firms improve their productivity through investment in R&D. The less there
are ¯rms in the union, the more they earn pro¯ts. Both workers and ¯rms
lobby the planner which determines the minimum wage for unskilled workers
and the ¯rms' market power and decides on new members to the union. The
main ¯ndings of the paper can be summarized the follows.
In a small union, there is a little competition and large pro¯ts. In that
case, there is political pressure on the planner to transfer income from the
¯rms to the workers through the minimum wage for the unskilled labor.
Since competition increases the demand for labor in production, then, in a
large union, a large proportion of labor is devoted to production and only
a small proportion to R&D. Because this leaves very little space for R&D,
the economic growth rate falls, and the planner will be subject to political
pressure to start supporting ¯rms and to relax labor market regulation.
Appendix









j = a: (37)











¼j ¡ vjlj + ¸lj
£
­(tj + 1;vj;¼j) ¡ ­(tj;vj;¼j)
¤o
: (38)
The ¯rst-order condition corresponding to this is given by
¸
£
­(tj + 1;vj;¼j) ¡ ­(tj;vj;¼j)
¤
= vj: (39)
I try the solution
¦j = ¯j¼j; ¯j 2 (0;1); ­ = ¦j=±j; (40)
8cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1994), WÄ alde (1999).
15in which dividends ¦j is in ¯xed proportion ¯j to pro¯ts ¼j, and the subjective
discount factor ±j > 0 is independent of income ¼j. Given (37) and (40), one
obtains
e ­ : = ­(tj + 1;vj;¼j) = ¯j¼
tj+1
j =±j = a¯j¼
tj
j =±j = a­(tj;vj;¼j): (41)
Inserting this and (40) into (38), one obtains
r = ¦j=­ + ¸lj
¡e ­=­ ¡ 1
¢
= ±j + (a ¡ 1)¸lj
and
±j = r + (1 ¡ a)¸lj > 0: (42)
From (40) and (17) it follows that
vjlj = ¼j ¡ ¦j = (1=¯j ¡ 1)¦j = (1 ¡ ¯j)¼j: (43)
Inserting (40), (41), (42) and (43) into (39), one obtains
(a ¡ 1)¸ = ¸(e ­=­ ¡ 1) = vj=­ = vj±j=¦j = (1=¯j ¡ 1)±j=lj
= (1=¯j ¡ 1)[r=lj + (1 ¡ a)¸]:
Noting (15), (40), (42), this equation de¯nes the function
¦j=¼j = ¯j = 1 + (1 ¡ a)¸lj=r > 0: (44)
Inserting this into (43) yields
vj = (1 ¡ ¯j)¼j=lj = (a ¡ 1)¸¼j=r: (45)




























logn = log(1 ¡ Á) ¡ logÁ ¡ logc(w=v;1) ¡ log[(a ¡ 1)¸=r]: (46)
16Di®erentiating the full-employment condition for skilled labor, (19), and







































































































Results (44), (45), (47), (48) and (49) prove (20) and (22).
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